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A B S T R A C T
We document changes in labour supply, wage and education by gender and marital status using the British
Household Panel Survey, 1991-2008, and seek to disentangle the main channels behind these changes. To this
end, we use a version of Goussé et al. (2016)'s search-matching model of the marriage market with labour
supply, which does not use information on home production time inputs. We derive conditions under which the
model is identiﬁed. We estimate diﬀerent parameters for each year. This allows us to quantify how much of the
changes in labour supply, wage and education by gender and marital status depends on changes in the
preferences for leisure of men and women and how much depends on changes in homophily.
1. Introduction
One of the key issues in understanding how tax policies aﬀect
labour supply is the intra-household allocation of time and consump-
tion. This is in particular the case of welfare beneﬁts, such as the
Working Family Tax Credit program in the UK and the Earned Income
Tax Credit in the US, aimed at providing work incentives and a safety
net against poverty at the same time. The models used to address these
issues typically take the household as a unit with unitary preferences
(from Eissa and Hoynes, 2004, to the recent work of Blundell et al.,
2016), and while the collective models of the family (Chiappori, 1988,
1992) oﬀer a solution for improvement by modeling intra-household
resource allocation, the interest of this framework for policy evaluation
is hampered by its inability to predict the impact of welfare policies on
the sharing rule.1 The evaluation of welfare policies for the family thus
ultimately requires an equilibrium model of match formation and
intra-household resource allocation.
Goussé et al. (2016), hereafter GJR, develop a search-matching and
bargaining model of the marriage market, à la Shimer and Smith
(2000), in which they add labour supply and household production. In
this model, individuals marry because of returns-to-scale in home
production and because of complementarities between spouses' char-
acteristics in preferences (homophily), in the Beckerian tradition
(Becker, 1981; Grossbard-Shechtman, 1993). At the same time, it
incorporates resource sharing and labour supply as in collective
models.
Modeling both marriage and consumption allows to endogenize the
sharing rule, i.e. how resources are split between spouses. As in
collective models, spouses’ labour supplies are chosen eﬃciently along
the Pareto frontier of the achievable set. The outside option is the value
of remaining single, which is equal to the instantaneous utility of the
wage plus the option value of a potential future marriage. Couples are
formed if an excess of public good is produced in the association. The
resulting surplus is split between spouses by Nash bargaining. Divorce
is endogenous and occurs when the idiosyncratic, match-speciﬁc public
good quality becomes too low for the match to remain mutually
beneﬁcial. As a result, the model generalizes both the collective labour
supply literature, to which we add an explicit mechanism for the
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sharing rule, and marriage market models, to which we add search
frictions.
This paper develops a version of GJR's model without home
production time uses. This considerably widens the scope of possible
applications, given the scarcity of precise data on individual inputs to
domestic production over time. We ﬁrst derive conditions under which
the model remains identiﬁed. Second we repeat GJR's analysis of time
changes in the labour supplies of men and women and in the
distributions of wages and education by gender and marital status,
with one diﬀerence. We estimate a new set of preference parameters for
each year of observation. This gives a high degree of ﬂexibility to ﬁt
labour supply changes over time, and allows us to study in greater
details the channels behind the observed dynamics in labour supply
and marriage decisions over the period.
We ﬁnd that the preference for leisure, in particular for men, should
change over time in order for the model to precisely ﬁt the observed
changes in labour supply over the period. In spite of a high degree of
ﬂexibility in estimated preferences, such changes are not enough to
fully recover observed changes in assortative matching. We also need to
allow for changes in the strength of homophily (in particular with
respect to spouses’ education) in order to explain the observed changes
in sorting (e.g. mean wages by marital status).
Many studies have looked at the link between marriage and earnings.
For example, the well-documented increase in assortative mating by
education is expected to impact income inequality both within house-
holds and between individuals. Most studies however ﬁnd almost no
eﬀect (Greenwood et al., 2014b, 2014a; Breen and Salazar, 2011; Eika
et al., 2014). Now, as Breen and Salazar, 2011 emphasizes, it could be
that educational sorting among partners is a poor proxy for sorting on
earnings. In that case, an equilibrium model of marriage and labour
supply is needed to relate education and earnings at the family level.
Chiappori et al. (2009) and Fernandez et al. (2005) develop models for
jointly analysing marriage decisions and the investment in schooling and
skills. Our approach rather focuses on the interrelation between
Fig. 2. Gender Wage Ratio.
Fig. 1. Wages and labour supply by gender and marital status.
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marriage and labour supply, with exogenous distributions of wages and
education. This amounts to take the changes in wage inequality as given
and study its impact on marriage and labour supply decisions.
We present the data and some facts about labour supply and sorting
in the next section. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 deals with
identiﬁcation and estimation.
2. The data
The data are drawn from the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS) from 1991 to 2008.2 This panel is representative of the British
population over the period excluding Northern Ireland and North of
the Caledonian Canal. We select individuals who are between 22 and 50
years old at the time of interview and who are either single or living
with a diﬀerent-sex partner (married or cohabiting). The same
individuals are re-interviewed in successive annual waves. We use
information on usual gross pay per month for the current job and the
number of hours normally worked per week (including paid and unpaid
overtime hours). Hourly wage is the usual gross pay per month divided
by the number of hours normally worked per month (without over-
time). Wages are computed in 2008 pounds.
Many individual-year observations on wages are missing because
zero hours worked are reported. The overall labour market participa-
tion rate is 69% for men and 65% for women, with some variations by
education and marital status. The participation rate is 73% for high
educated, married women and 59% for low educated, single women
(respectively, 83% and 66% for men). In order to reduce the number of
zero market hours and missing wages, we replace current observations
on wages and market hours by a (kernel-weighted) moving average of
past, present and future observations.3 The participation rate conse-
quently jumps to 87% for men and 88% for women. Then we trim the
1% top and bottom tails of wage and market work variables.
GJR construct a Family Values Index (FVI) based on individuals’
responses (1: strongly agree; 2: agree; 3: neither agree nor disagree; 4:
disagree; 5: strongly disagree) to various statements about children,
marriage, cohabitation and divorce. The signs of factor loadings are chosen
so that our family values index is a measure of conservativeness.4 GJR show
that family values play an important role in home production, less so in the
private preferences for consumption and leisure. Moreover, the FVI
changes very little over time. We will use the family values index as a
control, but we could omit it in this particular application.
Fig. 3. Distribution of wages in the population.
2 For a more detailed description, see GJR.
3 We use a Gaussian kernel weighting function yielding weights 1, 0.882, 0.607, 0.325,
0.135, 0.044, 0.011 for 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 years apart.
4 We estimate a diﬀerent FVI for each year. However, between two consecutive years
with no change in marital status, the FVI changes by less than 15% for more than 80% of
individuals. This change has no clear direction and is centred around 0.
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Fig. 1 summarizes the main trends in labour market outcomes by
gender and marital status over the 1991-2008 period. Fig. 1a shows
that men earn more than women, and that married individuals earn
more than singles. Wages increase in the decade following 1995, and
this increase is steeper for married people than for singles. By the end
of the period, married women have caught up with single men but the
gap between married men and women remains unchanged. Fig. 1b
shows that these wage changes have had little eﬀect on aggregate
labour supply. The ordering in hours worked between married and
single men and women remains very stable. Married males work more
than single males, who work much more than single and married
females. Nevertheless, by the end of the period, married women have
Fig. 5. Changes in education by gender and marital status.
Fig. 4. Distribution of female wage share of aggregate wage within couples (
wf
wf wm+
).
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increased labour supply by almost three hours per week, while single
men have decreased labour supply by two hours.
Fig. 2 shows that the female-male wage ratio has increased over
those years, from 0.78 to 0.92 for singles and from 0.67 to 0.76 for
married individuals. The decomposition by education in Fig. 2b shows
that this increase mainly concerns lower education levels. For high
educated individuals, the gender wage gap has remained stable for
singles and has slightly increased for married people.
Fig. 3 plots the distributions of log wages among couples in 1991-92
and in 2007-2008. Wage dispersion has increased over the period,
particularly for married women. The shift to the right of the distribu-
tion of married women's wages is accompanied by an increase in the
correlation of wages among couples (0.27 in 1991 and 0.35 in 2007).
Fig. 4 documents the repartition of wages within couples. It plots
the distributions of the female share of total household labour income
(i.e. the aggregate wage) across married couples, separately for 1991-
1992 and 2007-2008. The left panel displays the density and the right
panel the cumulative distribution. The 2007-2008 distribution stochas-
tically dominates the 1991-1992 distribution but not by a large extent.
A slow transition toward a reduction of the gender wage gap within
couples yet seems to be at work.
Finally we note that the strong increase in wages previously
documented, particularly for women and married individuals, is
paralleled by an increase in education for women and couples
(Fig. 5). Fig. 6 shows the repartition of couples by both spouses’
education in 1991-92 and in 2007-08. The fraction of couples where
both spouses are high-school dropouts has been divided by two.
Simultaneously, the fraction of couples where both spouses have higher
education has doubled during the period.
3. Theoretical framework
The aim of this paper is to perform a decomposition of the observed
dynamics of household labour supply and matching patterns. We want
to quantify how much of these changes results from composition
changes (e.g. from a higher proportion of educated and high wage
women), and how much results from changes in preferences and/or
home production. To carry out this exercise we need a model. This
section provides a presentation of a simpliﬁed version of the structural
search and matching model of marriage with labour supply ﬁrst
introduced by GJR.
3.1. Overview of the model
We consider a population of individuals segmented by gender. Men
and women are heterogeneous in characteristics such as education,
wages and family values, assumed observable and ﬁxed. Each unique
combination of characteristics deﬁnes a type.
Single individuals randomly meet in the marriage market. There is
no search during marriage. Upon meeting, they must decide whether to
accept the current match or wait for a better potential partner. The
overall distribution of types by gender is exogenous, but the distribu-
tions of types by gender and marital status is endogenous.
The matching decision is modelled as follows. A fraction of house-
hold resources is used to produce a public good. If two potential
partners home-produce more together than separately (through task
specialization, so as to give birth to children, etc.) a surplus is produced
that is shared between spouses by Nash bargaining, using the value of
being single as the outside option. Matching occurs if the match surplus
is positive. Through Nash bargaining partners determine optimal levels
of income transfers between them and also how much to save,
collectively, in order to ﬁnance home production.
In the real world there is no such thing as perfect homogamy.
Empirical perfect assignment models of the marriage market account
for such mismatch by assuming i.i.d measurement error in the
marriage surplus (Choo and Siow, 2006; Galichon and Salanié, 2012;
Dupuy and Galichon, 2014). We rather consider an idiosyncratic
source of heterogeneity in the match surplus that aﬀects the level of
the home-produced public good. In addition, the match-speciﬁc
component is subject to shocks, which is a way of endogenizing
divorce. If the couple does not separate as a result of the match-
speciﬁc shock, transfers may yet be renegotiated to diﬀerent levels in
the same way as before.
Fig. 6. Distribution of education within couples.
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3.2. Meetings, marriages and divorces
Types are denoted i for males and j for females, and we use the
subscripts m and f to index gender. The number of individuals of each
type is given by the density functions iℓ ( )m and jℓ ( )f , with ∫L i i= ℓ ( )dm m
and ∫L j j= ℓ ( )df f . Let m i j( , ) denote the number of couples of a given
type in the population, resulting in ∬M m i j i j= ( , )d d couples in the
whole population. Let n i n j N N( ), ( ), ,m f m f denote the corresponding
densities and number of individuals for singles. These quantities are
related to each other by simple accounting restrictions,
∫ ∫i n i m i j j j n j m i j iℓ ( ) = ( ) + ( , )d , ℓ ( ) = ( ) + ( , )d .m m f f (3.1)
We denote λm and λf the rates at which male and female singles
meet other singles per unit of time. The number of males meeting a
female (λ Nm m) is equal to the number of females meeting a male (λ Nf f ).
Let λ λ N λ N= / = /m f f m. Let αij denote the equilibrium probability of
marriage for a male of type i meeting a female of type j. Although this
probability is type-speciﬁc (through the type-dependency of partners
surplus from marriage) the meeting probabilities are assumed to be the
same for all individuals of a given gender. In principle, we could allow
for some amount of directed search whereby high educated males
would have a higher probability of meeting high educated females for
example. However, if we go too far in the direction of heterogeneous
meeting rates, then, absent data on dating, the separate identiﬁcation
of meeting/divorce rates (λ and δ) and matching probabilities becomes
diﬃcult if not simply impossible.
For a given value of αij, the number of new marriages (or
cohabitations) of type (i,j) per unit of time is
MF i j n i λ
n j
N
α n j λ n i
N
α λn i n j α( , ) = ( )
( )
= ( ) ( ) = ( ) ( ) .m m
f
f
ij f f
m
m
ij m f ij
It has three components: a single male of type i, out of the nm(i)
identical ones, meets a single female with probability λ λN=m f ; this
woman is of type j with probability n j N( )/f f ; the marriage is consum-
mated with probability αij.
The marriage probability αij is a non-degenerate probability be-
cause there exists a match-speciﬁc utility component z that is drawn
from a distribution G at the ﬁrst meeting. This random utility
component generates heterogeneity in the matching decisions. In
addition, we allow the match-speciﬁc component to be updated
infrequently through i.i.d. shocks from the same distribution G
according to a Poisson process with parameter δ. Spouses’ decision
to remain together results from the updated surplus of the current
match: divorce occurs if the updated value of z does no longer satisfy
the matching rule. This happens with probability α1 − ij. The ﬂow of
(i,j) divorces per unit of time is thus equal to
DF i j m i j δ α( , ) = ( , ) (1 − ).ij
Thanks to this match dissolution mechanism, the observed ﬂow of
divorce DF i j( , ), and the number of (i,j) couples, m i j( , ), also contribute
to the identiﬁcation of the matching parameters (see GJR for details).
Note that this mechanism explains why many matches will end
relatively quickly, the divorce rate stabilizing at a low value after the
ﬁrst two years of marriage.
We shall assume that the population is approximately in a steady
state. This is a more reasonable approximation than it may seem at ﬁrst
sight. Indeed, if the ﬂow of new marriage were vastly superior to the
ﬂow of divorces (and not death since we focus on prime age
individuals) then the number of couples would grow, which is not
what we see in the data (see Fig. 7).
The steady state restriction imposes that ﬂows in and out of the
stocks of married couples of each type exactly balance each other out:
for all i j( , ), DF i j MF i j( , ) = ( , ), or
δ α m i j λn i n j α(1 − ) ( , ) = ( ) ( ) .ij m f ij
This deﬁnes the equilibrium number of (i,j) couples as
m i j n i n j( , ) = ( ) ( )λδ
α i j
α i j m f
( , )
1 − ( , ) . Given the accounting restrictions (3.1), the
equilibrium measures of singles are solutions to the following ﬁxed-
point system:
∫ ∫
n i i
n j α i j
α i j
j
n j
j
n i α i j
α i j
i
( ) = ℓ ( )
1 + ( ) ( , )
1 − ( , )
d
, ( ) =
ℓ ( )
1 + ( ) ( , )
1 − ( , )
d
.m mλ
δ f
f
f
λ
δ m
(3.2)
3.3. Preferences and home production
The instantaneous ﬂow of utility enjoyed either as a single or as a
spouse is drawn from private consumption c0 (whose price is normal-
ized to one), private leisure e, and a public good q that is produced in-
house. We normalize to one the total amount of time available per week
to any individual. So market hours is h e≡ 1 − , andwi is both the wage
rate and the total income available to the individual. For simplicity,
wages are assumed perfectly observable and deterministic.
Since home production is not observed, we normalize it by setting
his value equal to 1 for singles. And for married couples, we assume
that home production only requires some amount of market good
expenditure c, namely,
q zF c F c Z c C= ( ), ( ) = ( − ) .ij ij ij ij K1 1
The scale shifter Zij is a deterministic source of externality that only
depends on spouses’ types. For identiﬁcation we shall introduce type
complementarities (interactions) only in the match quality parameter
Zij, and not in minimal expenditure Cij.
A single of type i has his/her entire total income wi free to allocate
between consumption and leisure: c we w+ =i i0 . For a married couple
of male-female type (i,j), we have
c we w t R c we w t R+ = − ≡ , + = − ≡ ,m i m i m m f j f j f f0 0
where transfers tm,tf are used to ﬁnance the home production input:
c t t= +m f . Note that transfers can be negative, but not both at the
same time. Transfers are a way of redistributing resources to children
as well as between spouses.
Fig. 7. Shares of married and unmarried by gender.
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Individual with exogenous characteristics i draw utility U c e q( , , )i 0
from privation consumption, leisure and the public good. Assuming
corner solutions away, we will work with the corresponding indirect
utility, assumed to be of the quasi-linear form:
ψ R q U c e q c e c we R
q R A w
B w
( , ) ≡ max{ ( , , ): > 0, 1 > > 0, + ≤ }
= − ( )
( )
,
i i i
i i
i i
0 0 0
(3.3)
where Ai and Bi are diﬀerentiable, non-decreasing and concave
functions of the wage wi and other individual characteristics such as
gender and education.5 This speciﬁcation is standard in the labour
supply literature (linear demand systems). We also normalize the
denominator as B (1) = 1.i The demands for consumption and leisure
follow from the indirect utility function by application of Roy's identity.
3.4. Marriage contracts
Transfers and the quantity of public good produced are determined by
the marriage contract that spouses sign upon meeting. We assume that
individuals can walk away from the negotiation at any time. Marriage
contracts must thus be mutually beneﬁcial for their whole duration.
Speciﬁcally, the contract between a male of type i and a female of type j,
endowed with a given draw of the current match-speciﬁc shock z, speciﬁes a
per-period utility level for both spouses, um and uf (generated using the
indirect utility previously described), and two promised continuation
values, V z( ′)m1 and V z( ′)f1 , for any realization z′ of the next match-speciﬁc
shock. We index u and V1 by subscripts m and f instead of i and j because
they are at this point variables that remain to be determined. The
equilibrium solutions will be functions of types i and j.
Let Wm and Wf denote the present value of a marriage contract for
any given choice of u u V V( , , , )m f m f1 1 , and let Vi0 and Vj0 similarly denote
the value of single-hood for type-i men and type-j women. Let r denote
the discount rate. The marriage values are related to the values of
remaining single by the following Bellman equation:
∫rW u δ V V z W G z= + [max{ , ( ′)} − ]d ( ′),m m i m m0 1 (3.4)
The ﬂow value of marriage is the sum of the instantaneous utility and a
term that values the event of a shock to the match-speciﬁc component.
With probability δ there is a shock and a new value z′ is drawn from
distribution G. If the new value of marriage V z( ′)m1 is less than the value
of single-hood Vi0 a divorce occurs; otherwise the match continues with
a new way of sharing resources.
Marriage utilities um,uf depend on optimal choices of c t t, ,m f as
u ψ w t q u ψ w t q q zF c= ( − , ), = ( − , ), with = ( ).m i i m f j j f ij
1
The household ﬁrst determines the optimal choice of c t t, ,m f by
maximizing the Nash bargaining criterion
W V W Vmax( − ) ( − ) ,
c t t m i
β
f j
β
, ,
0 0 1−
m f (3.5)
subject to the feasibility constraint c t t= +m f , and where β is a
bargaining parameter.
Without commitment, the promise-keeping constraint imposes that
W V z= ( )m m1 . Denoting x x≡ max{ , 0}+ , the equilibrium surplus from
marriage follows as
∫r δ V z V u δ V z V G z rV( + )[ ( ) − ] = + [ ( ′) − ] d ( ′) − ,m i m m i i1 0 1 0 + 0 (3.6)
with a symmetric expression for V z( )f1 . Note that the equilibrium value
of a marriage contract between spouses is a function of types i j, and z.
We shall use the notation V i j z V i j z( , , ), ( , , )m f1 1 whenever necessary to
make precise the dependence on i j, .
The matching probability is the probability that the participation
constraint holds at the current value of i j z( , , ), that is
α V z V V z V= Pr{ ( ) − ≥ 0 and ( ) − ≥ 0}.ij m i f j1 0 1 0
The present value of single-hood follows as
∬rV ψ w λ V i j z V
V z V
V z V G z n j j
1
= ( , 1) + [ ( , , ) − ]
× { ( ) − ≥ 0 and
( ) − ≥ 0}d ( ) ( )d ,
i i i m i
m i
f j f
0 1 0
1 0
1 0
(3.7)
The continuation value is the expected value of marriage. For this a meeting
must occur and the contract that results from Nash bargaining must make
marriage preferable to remaining single for both dating individuals.
3.5. Equilibrium solution with transferable utility
We show in GJR that the equilibrium of this economy satisﬁes two
important properties. First, domestic production is determined indepen-
dently of transfers and continuation values (separability): public good
expenditures only depends on individual characteristics and preferences.
Secondly, there exists a function Sij(z) measuring the surplus from
marriage of a male of type i and a female of type j whose match speciﬁc
draw is z. This surplus is shared between spouses and matching requires
positive surplus (transferability). We summarize below the main steps of
the model solution, and highlight the relationships that allow to estimate
the model from observed consumption and matching patterns.
3.5.1. Equilibrium households consumption
The ﬁrst order conditions of the Nash bargaining problem (3.5)
with respect to domestic production are
F c
c
K
c C X
∂ln ( )
∂
=
−
= 1 ,ij
1
ij
where X w w A A c≡ + − − −i j i j is the net total private expenditure,
i.e. what is left of total income w w+i j to be spent on private
consumption and leisure after spending c on home production above
and beyond the minimal expenditures A A+i j. Optimal home produc-
tion expenditure then follows as
c i j
C K w w A A
K
( , ) =
+ ( + − − )
1 +
,ij i j i j
(3.8)
and the equilibrium values of net private expenditure and domestic
production is
X
w w A A C
K
F Z K X=
+ − − −
1 +
, = .ij
i j i j ij
ij ij
K
ij
K1
(3.9)
Thanks to the multiplicative nature of the public good provision rule,
these equilibrium quantities only depend on individual characteristics
and not on the match speciﬁc shock.
3.5.2. Surplus sharing
The match surplus results from the ﬁrst-order conditions of the
Nash bargaining problem (3.5) with respect to transfers,
qβ
B r δ V z V
q β
B r δ V z V
q
S z( + )[ ( ) − ]
= (1 − )
( + )[ ( ) − ]
=
( )i m i j f j ij1 0 1 0 (3.10)
where
S z B r δ V z V B r δ V z V( ) ≡ ( + )[ ( ) − ] + ( + )[ ( ) − ]ij i m i j f j1 0 1 0
deﬁnes the match surplus.
Denote ∫S S z G z≡ ( ′) d ( ′)ij ij + the integrated surplus. The promise
keeping constraint (3.6) implies that the match surplus satisﬁes the
following Bellman equation:6
5 The symbol ≡ means “equal by deﬁnition”. 6 See GJR, Appendix A for details on the algebra.
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S z qX B rV B rV δ
r δ
S( ) = − − +
+
.ij ij i i j j ij
0 0
(3.11)
The equilibrium integrated surplus then solves the ﬁxed-point equa-
tion:
?
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟S F X
B rV B rV S
F X
=
+ −
,ij ij ij
i i j j
δ
r δ ij
ij ij
1
0 0
+
1
(3.12)
where ? ∫ ∫s z s G z z G z s G s( ) ≡ ( − ) d ( ) = d ( ) − [1 − ( )]s
+ +∞ .7
These equations allow to calculate the integrated surplus and the
match surplus given the values of being/remaining single. The prob-
ability that a match i j z( , , ) is consummated then follows as
?
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥α S z G
S
F X
= Pr{ ( ) > 0} = 1 − .ij ij
ij
ij ij
−1
1
(3.13)
Finally, the value of single-hood is the sum of the utility ﬂow of
being single plus the option value of marriage. The equilibrium rent-
sharing Eq. (3.10) imply that
∫
∫
B rV Bψ λβ
r δ
S n j j
B rV Bψ λ β
r δ
S n i i
= +
+
( )d ,
= + (1 − )
+
( )d .
i i i i ij f
j j j j ij m
0 0
0 0
(3.14)
Note that the equilibrium is fully characterized by BrVi0, B rVj j0,
nm(i), and nf(j). In practice, the equilibrium is computed by iterating on
Eqs. (3.2), (3.14) until convergence, making use of Eqs. (3.12), (3.13)
to compute αij and with ∫N n i i= ( )dm m and ∫N n j j= ( )df f .
Lastly, some algebra shows that equilibrium transfers t i j z( , , )m and
t i j z( , , )f are a way of sharing net total private expenditure Xij:
w A t β z X w A t β z X− − = ( ) , − − = [1 − ( )] .i i m ij ij j j f ij ij (3.15)
The sharing rule β z( )ij depends on the bargaining parameter β and the
outside option (single-hood) in the following way:
β z β
z
β B rV βB rV
F X
( ) = + 1
(1 − ) −
.ij
i i j j
ij ij
0 0
1
(3.16)
This equation shows how outside options (single-hood) can move the
sharing rule above or below the exogenous bargaining power level β.
4. Estimation and results
The model is estimated on BHPS data. We ﬁrst describe how
structural components of the model depend on observables, and
discuss identiﬁcation.
4.1. Parametric speciﬁcation
We introduce exogenous variations in the structural components of
the model through several dimensions of observable heterogeneity:
gender gi, education Edi, wage wi and the family values index xi. We
specify preference parameters as
A
a Ed
b
a
b
w
a
b
w B b w
g g m f
= −
( )
+
1 −
+
2 −
, ln = ln ,
= ∈ { , },
i
g i
g
g
g
i
g
g
i i g i
i
0 1 2 2
with a Ed a( ) =g i gH0 0 or a0gL, depending on the education indicator
Ed H L∈ { , }i , where L refers to high school dropout or vocational andH
to higher education (high school and higher). The demand for leisure,
with given transfer ti (t = 0i for singles), thus writes:
we a Ed a w a w b R R w t= ( ) + + + , with = − .i i g i g i g i g i i i i0 1 2 2 (4.1)
Domestic production depends on gender, education and family
values but not on wages:
C C c Ed H c Ed H c x c x1 1≡ + ( = ) + ( = ) + + ,ij mH i fH j m i f j1 1
where C c c c c, , , ,mH fH m f1 1 are 5 scalar parameters and Ed H1( = )i is
equal to 1 if Ed H=i and 0 otherwise. Public good quality Zij is a
general function of spouses' characteristics:
Z Z Ed w x Ed w x≡ ( , , , , , ),ij i i i j j j
that will be estimated non-parametrically. We let Zij depend on wages
and on interactions between male and female factors. This will allow us
to estimate the source of marriage externalities that is not already
accounted for by resource sharing through common funding of the
public good.
Lastly, the distribution of match-speciﬁc shocks z is log-normal:
G z Φ z σ( ) = (ln( )/ )z , where Φ is the standard normal cdf and σz is the
standard deviation of z. We then have
?
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟s sΦ
s
σ
e Φ s
σ
σ( ) = − − ln + − ln + .
z
σ
z
z2
z
2
4.2. Identiﬁcation
We prove identiﬁcation without data on domestic production inputs
under the preceding parametric speciﬁcation, assuming in particular
that 1) Zij depends on interactions between spouses’ types but not Cij,
and 2) Cij does not depend on wages.
First, matching parameters λ δ α, , ij are directly inferred from
observed ﬂows by type on the marriage market. Second, preference
parameters are identiﬁed from labour supply as follows. For singles,
Eq. (4.1) takes the form:
we a Ed a b w a w= ( ) + ( + ) + .i g i g g i g i0 0 1 2 2 (4.2)
Without separate variation in income and wages, a b+g g1 is identiﬁed
but not a1g and bg separately. This is the usual identiﬁcation issue with
labour supply models. Parameters a1g and bg are not separately
identiﬁed unless a source of non-earned income is observed. For
married couples, the leisure Eq. (4.1) together with Eqs. (3.15),
(3.16) for transfers imply that
we a
b
w a
b
w b β z X
we
a
b
w
a
b
w b β z X
=
1 −
+ 2
2 −
+ ( ) ,
=
1 −
+
2
2 −
+ [1 − ( )] .
i m
m
m
i
m
m
i m ij ij
j f
f
f
j
f
f
j f ij ij
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
(4.3)
The important empirical implication of this equation is that leisure
demands em1 and ef1 exhibit variations that are independent of wages.
These variations come not only from the match-speciﬁc component z,
but also from the interactions betweens observable spouses' character-
istics. Moreover, under the assumption that complementarities (such
as interactions between spouses’ education levels) aﬀect parameter Zij
but not Cij, then the net private expenditure X =ij
w w C A A
K
+ − − −
1 +
i j ij i j does
not depend on interactions terms while β z( )ij does. This restriction on
individual characteristics thus generates further independent varia-
tions in the leisure equations.
Denote ζ one such observable interaction term, assumed continuous
for simplicity.8 Diﬀerentiating Eq. (4.3), with β z ζ∂ ( )/∂ ≠ 0ij , we obtain
an identifying restriction for b b/m f :
7 The function ? is decreasing and invertible on the support of G, with ? G′ = − (1 − ).
It is thus a contracting operator.
8 Note that cross-wage interactions w w*i j will not work for ζ if they does not determine
Zij.
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we ζ
we ζ
b
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j f
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1
(4.4)
Next, eliminating β z( )ij from Eq. (4.3) yields
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(4.5)
Assuming further that Cij does not depend on wages, one can
diﬀerentiate this equation with respect to wages wi and wj and obtain
two additional restrictions involving bm, bf and K (given that the other
preference parameters are already identiﬁed by the leisure equations
for singles). That makes three equations for three parameters that
generically suﬃce for identiﬁcation.
Once preference parameters and elasticity K have been identiﬁed,
Eq. (4.5) identiﬁes Cij. The identiﬁcation of bargaining power β and of
the variance of the match-speciﬁc component z ﬁnally follow as in GJR.
4.3. Parameter estimates
The model is separately estimated for every couple of years in the list
1991-92, 93-94,…, 2007-08 by GMM as explained in the Appendix. The
results are displayed in Table 1. The parameters driving the demand for
leisure seem to increase overtime. The parameter a0 strongly increases for
Table 1
Estimated Parameters.
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
β 0.4806 0.4802 0.4927 0.4843 0.4815 0.4813 0.5025 0.4804 0.4847
(0.1595) (0.1722) (0.1600) (0.1453) (0.1863) (0.1621) (0.1079) (0.1147) (0.1370)
Preferences
a0fL 0.5031 0.5690 0.5013 0.5829 0.5896 0.5165 0.5877 0.5412 0.5155
(0.1326) (0.1400) (0.1670) (0.1641) (0.2101) (0.2339) (0.2262) (0.2169) (0.2247)
a0mL 0.8819 0.8336 0.8463 0.6000 0.8651 1.0954 1.2732 1.1087 1.0897
(0.1333) (0.1300) (0.1453) (0.1219) (0.1510) (0.1559) (0.1795) (0.1316) (0.1377)
a0fH 0.5005 0.5001 0.5390 0.5010 0.5012 0.5011 0.5057 0.5002 0.5013
(0.1336) (0.1432) (0.1701) (0.1682) (0.2189) (0.2336) (0.2267) (0.2196) (0.2198)
a0mH 1.0673 1.1853 1.0315 0.8859 1.0848 1.3553 1.5099 1.4247 1.5335
(0.1371) (0.1361) (0.1575) (0.1329) (0.1631) (0.1647) (0.1846) (0.1420) (0.1426)
a1f 0.2845 0.2842 0.2658 0.2752 0.2870 0.2785 0.3314 0.3008 0.2836
(0.0765) (0.0763) (0.0669) (0.0484) (0.0600) (0.0675) (0.0679) (0.0722) (0.1073)
a1m 0.1608 0.2042 0.1676 0.2032 0.1433 0.1465 0.1616 0.1863 0.1696
(0.0650) (0.0625) (0.0543) (0.0468) (0.0610) (0.0677) (0.0683) (0.0523) (0.0529)
a2f −0.0091 −0.0090 −0.0082 −0.0073 −0.0065 −0.0064 −0.0079 −0.0080 −0.0079
(0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0021)
a2m 0.0035 0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0012 0.0006 0.0010 0.0014 0.0010 0.0008
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0010)
b1f 0.3586 0.3626 0.3957 0.3846 0.3667 0.3740 0.3456 0.3733 0.3996
(0.0647) (0.0635) (0.0621) (0.0469) (0.0501) (0.0595) (0.0654) (0.0694) (0.0949)
b1m 0.2501 0.2506 0.2886 0.2812 0.3118 0.2988 0.2638 0.2504 0.2746
(0.0464) (0.0456) (0.0453) (0.0402) (0.0538) (0.0544) (0.0491) (0.0431) (0.0507)
Home production
C 3.9363 3.7017 3.3038 4.4963 3.7167 4.1636 4.6001 4.2404 2.7159
(1.7211) (1.5909) (1.3347) (1.0997) (1.2157) (1.5382) (2.0061) (1.8102) (1.9418)
c1f −0.5930 −0.6087 −0.5214 −0.7518 −0.5352 −0.5584 −0.5297 −0.5014 −0.5052
(0.2389) (0.2600) (0.2651) (0.2086) (0.2259) (0.2538) (0.2825) (0.2621) (0.2817)
c1m −0.4969 −0.3636 −0.2974 −0.4311 −0.3728 −0.5189 −0.4091 −0.3754 0.1374
(0.2413) (0.2418) (0.2910) (0.2229) (0.2335) (0.2647) (0.3699) (0.3726) (0.3665)
cfH −1.2049 −0.9055 −0.4120 −0.5015 −0.5362 −0.3395 −0.9060 −1.0889 −1.0400
(0.3544) (0.3250) (0.2828) (0.2528) (0.2555) (0.2651) (0.3606) (0.3350) (0.3380)
cmH 0.5771 0.9064 0.1436 0.6296 0.2497 −0.0755 −0.6154 0.0579 0.6167
(0.3128) (0.3572) (0.3012) (0.2668) (0.2819) (0.3234) (0.3801) (0.3538) (0.3490)
K 0.0142 0.0140 0.0214 0.0185 0.0093 0.0048 0.0080 0.0092 0.0080
(0.0691) (0.0639) (0.0561) (0.0489) (0.0446) (0.0478) (0.0614) (0.0532) (0.0601)
Note. Preference parameters estimated separately for every couple of years. Standard errors in parentheses.
M. Goussé et al. Labour Economics 46 (2017) 131–149
139
men (particularly for educated men). There is no clear monotonic trend for
the other parameters, but some slight tendency. For women, the parameter
a1 slightly increases and the negative parameter a2 decreases in absolute
value. Besides b1 increase for both genders. Domestic production constant
cost (C) decreases overtime. On average, men's education increases the
domestic production cost whereas women's education decreases the
domestic production cost but less and less overtime. Finally, high family
values decrease domestic production cost, particularly so for women, but
this eﬀect seems to decrease overtime. The bargaining power coeﬃcient is
estimated around 0.5, which implies that the balance of powers between
spouses in the family is only function of the outside options.9
Our model delivers a non-parametric estimate of the match quality
parameter Zij. This is a complex function of spouses’ wages, education
and family values indices. In Table 2 we present the results of the least-
square projection of Zln ij on indicators of the wage diﬀerential, and the
education and family values of both spouses, including interactions.
The match quality clearly and signiﬁcantly decreases with the relative
wage of the female spouse. At the same time, there is strong evidence of
homophily in education. There are few obvious trends in the para-
meters. The only obvious one is for female education – educated
women becoming more “attractive” over the years.
4.4. Model ﬁt
Starting from random initial distributions of single and couples in
the population, we simulate the equilibrium and predict the distribu-
Table 2
Matching preferences.
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Intercept 0.890 0.746 0.778 0.773 0.640 0.732 0.694 0.766 0.540
(0.024) (0.024) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.027) (0.026)
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥0.25 0.50< ≤
wf
wf wm+
−0.074 −0.022 −0.044 −0.054 −0.051 −0.054 −0.095 −0.115 −0.049
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥0.50 0.70< ≤
wf
wf wm+
−0.130 −0.068 −0.107 −0.114 −0.129 −0.139 −0.174 −0.173 −0.093
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥0.70 <
wf
wf wm+
−0.251 −0.185 −0.270 −0.274 −0.295 −0.242 −0.287 −0.237 −0.196
(0.026) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.027) (0.033)
FVIm −0.156 −0.148 −0.163 −0.144 −0.134 −0.160 −0.147 −0.146 −0.072
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
FVIf −0.127 −0.123 −0.146 −0.133 −0.107 −0.142 −0.109 −0.113 −0.099
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
FVI FVI*m f 0.041 0.043 0.053 0.047 0.048 0.056 0.053 0.050 0.040
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Educ HS( = )m −0.095 −0.041 −0.085 −0.017 −0.024 −0.046 −0.052 −0.064 −0.013
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Educ HS( = )f −0.191 −0.131 −0.074 −0.092 −0.064 0.012 0.040 0.009 −0.015
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Educ HS( > )m −0.214 −0.200 −0.159 −0.152 −0.201 −0.203 −0.232 −0.216 −0.203
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012)
Educ HS( > )f −0.214 −0.181 −0.195 −0.223 −0.229 −0.189 −0.217 −0.192 −0.158
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Educ HS Educ HS( = )*( = )m f 0.186 0.162 0.171 0.111 0.081 0.038 0.077 0.084 0.074
(0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
Educ HS Educ HS( > )*( > )m f 0.403 0.397 0.375 0.346 0.378 0.413 0.422 0.409 0.379
(0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016)
Educ HS Educ HS( > )*( = )m f 0.164 0.187 0.142 0.142 0.155 0.184 0.193 0.183 0.216
(0.018) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016)
Educ HS Educ HS( = )*( > )m f 0.132 0.138 0.187 0.139 0.103 0.123 0.148 0.131 0.118
(0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
R2 0.51 0.39 0.44 0.41 0.50 0.42 0.49 0.40 0.32
Note. Least-square projection of Zln ij on the regressors. Standard errors in parentheses.
9 σz is not well estimated as we do not obtain convergence in each period (see appendix
B, step 3). Instead, we ﬁx it at 0.38 for all periods.
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tions of characteristics among couples and singles and labour supplies.
Our model performs well in predicting the average labour supplies of
men and women by marital status over the period (Fig. 8). The model
also predicts the equilibrium number of singles and couples with less
than 5% of error for each period. Finally the prediction of working
hours conditionally on wages and education is also quite good (Fig. 9),
and so is the ﬁt of the distribution of female relative earnings and
wages (Fig. 10).
4.5. Counterfactual analysis
We now turn to the main empirical question of the paper: what are
the main components of the changes in labour supply and sorting
shown in Section 2? Three main factors and their evolutions can
explain these changes: the distributions of characteristics in the
population of males and females (in particular, wages and education);
preferences and home production; and public good quality.
Fig. 8. Fit of market work trends and wage trends.
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Fig. 9. Market work simulations in 2007-08.
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To separately identify the speciﬁc contribution of each one of these
factors, we run three counterfactual experiments. In the ﬁrst experi-
ment, we ﬁx Zij at its estimated 1991 value and we simulate a new
equilibrium for each two-year observation sample between 1991 and
2008 (the other parameters being set equal to their estimated values in
all years). In the second co nounterfactual simulation, we let Zij vary
according to its estimated value in each year and we keep all other
parameters ﬁxed at their 1991 values. In the last experiment, only
composition eﬀects are allowed for (changes in the exogenous distribu-
tions of exogenous characteristics).
The remaining ﬁgures of the paper clearly show that preferences are
responsible for the observed changes in labour supply, and public good
quality accounts for the changes in marriage sorting. Without the
estimated variation in Zij (Figs. 11, 12) there are fewer marriages and
the number of singles tends to be overestimated. Moreover, the wages
of married men and women are well predicted, but the wages of singles
are overestimated. This is because there is more education comple-
mentarity in 2007 than in 1991. So with the 1991 parameters we
simulate fewer marriages between high educated individuals.
Consequently, the wages of singles increase. Without the estimated
variations in the preference parameters (Figs. 13,14), the labour
market supply of women and single men would be much higher than
observed. A look at Table 1 shows that the preference for leisure has
increased over time for both men and women. Lastly, if we ﬁx all
parameters (preferences and public good quality), we obtain the worst
of the two worlds (ﬁgures available upon request).
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a version of GJR's search-
matching model of the marriage market with labour supply but without
home production time inputs. We derive conditions under which the
marriage and household labour supply model remains identiﬁed. We
estimate the model using GMM on data drawn from the British
Household Panel Survey, 1991-2008, and we allow preference para-
meters to evolve over the observation period. We show that the
preference for leisure of men should change over time in order to ﬁt
the observed dynamics in labour supply. We also need to allow for
changes in the strength of homophily (in particular with respect to
spouses' education) in order to explain the observed changes in sorting.
As GJR obtain a good ﬁt of the data with time-invariant parameters, we
conclude that it is important to model family labour supply in
conjunction with time spent in home production.
Many labour market policies condition beneﬁts on marital status
and the number of children. This requires a non trivial extension of the
model, but one that should be high on the agenda. Also, one critical
assumption that we make in this paper is the time invariance of wages.
However, it is likely that many interesting features of the marriage
market could be better ﬁtted with wages varying with age and subject to
stochastic shocks. Such an extension is desirable yet also non trivial as
it will make the model non stationary.
Fig. 10. Fit of distribution of female spouse's share of total labour earnings and wages in 2007-08.
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Fig. 11. Counterfactual trends (All parameters vary; but Zij stays at 1991 level).
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Fig. 12. Counterfactual market hours in 2007-08 (All parameters vary; but Zij stays at 1991 level).
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Fig. 13. Counterfactual trends, (Only Zij varies; all other parameters remain ﬁxed at 1991 value).
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Fig. 14. Counterfactual market hours in 2007-08 (Only Zij varies; all other parameters remain ﬁxed at 1991 value).
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Appendix – Estimation algorithm
Let us consider one two-year cross-section of household data on time uses, gender, wages, family values and education. We use couples of years
to increase sample size. In this section, the index i refers to an observation unit of the sample of male singles, j refers to female singles, and (i,j)
refers to couples. For singles, we observe labour supply hi0 and education Ed L H∈ { , }i , wages wi and family values indices xi. For couples, the
corresponding time use observations are hmij1 and hfij1 . Leisure is e h= 1 − . The estimation procedure is iterative and goes through the following
steps.
1. Estimate λ δ α, , ij from non-parametric estimates of stock densities n i n j m i j( ), ( ), ( , )m f and corresponding ﬂows as described in GJR.
2. Given a value for σz, estimate the parameters of preferences and domestic productions, as well as bargaining power β, by two-stage GMM ﬁrst
with metric equal to the identity matrix and second with metric equal to the diagonal of the inverse of variance-covariance matrix of moments.
GMM are based on the following residuals and instruments:
(a) For single men, the residuals are
u e a Ed w a a w b= − ( )/ − − − ,i i m i i m m i m0 0 0 1 2
with a similar expression for single women. The instruments are
ξ Ed H x w Ed H w1 1= (1, ( = ), , , ( = )/ ).i i i i i i
This is the way the exogenous characteristics condition the residuals.
(b) For couples, the residuals are
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The instruments are ξ ξ⊗i j. The leisure residuals follow from Eqs. (4.3), (3.15), after taking the expectation with respect to z. Note that the
distribution of ??z σ∼ (0, )z2 implies that 
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and that marriage is consummated if z G α≥ (1 − )ij−1 for the
marriage probability to be equal to αij. We back out S B rV B rV, ,ij i i j j0 0 and F Xij ij1 from matching probabilities αij, given type densities n i n j( ), ( )m f
and the other parameters, by solving a ﬁxed-point system similar to the equilibrium system in Section 3.5. For a more detailed description of
this step, see GJR.
3. Estimate σz by ﬁtting the variance-covariance matrix of market hours for couples. Then repeat steps 2 and 3 until numerical convergence.
4. Lastly, estimate public good quality Zij from (3.9):
Z F X K X= [ ] .ij ij ij K ij K1 1+
−1
Once the model has been estimated, an economy can be simulated by computing the equilibrium as indicated in Section 3.5. Speciﬁcally, for every
two-year cross section, given estimated parameters and the observed distributions of male and female types in the population (i.e. i jℓ ( ), ℓ ( )m f ), we
use the equilibrium ﬁxed point to calculate conditional distributions n i n j m i j( ), ( ), ( , )m f together with values S B rV B rV, ,ij i i j j0 0. Note that individual
types comprise one continuous variable, the wage, and the family values index is approximately continuous as it is constructed by aggregation of
many discrete variables. Hence, functions Sij, B rVi i0, B rVj j0, nm(i), nf(j), m i j( , ) have to be discretized and integrals in equilibrium operators have to be
approximated. We rely for that on Clenshaw-Curtis quadrature and Chebyshev polynomials.
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